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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 920126-CA

v.
Priority No. 2

RENE RUIZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii) (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did a warrant to search defendant's apartment, which
was supported by probable cause, also properly authorize police
officers to conduct the search at night, and on an unannounced,
"no-knock" basis?
To justify a no-knock, nighttime search, the affidavit
supporting a warrant application must make a particularized
showing that such a search is necessary.

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d

730, 732-33 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
As set forth in the State's argument, this requirement entails
deferential appellate review, asking only whether the affidavit

contains some factual information upon which a no-knock,
nighttime search could be authorized.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution,
and Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution are virtually
identical in text.

The former provision reads:

The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Utah's "no-knock" search statute, Utah Code Ann. § 7723-10 (1990), states in pertinent part:
When a search warrant has been issued
. . the officer executing the warrant may use
such force as is reasonably necessary to
enter:
. . .

(2) Without notice of his authority and
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the
warrant directs in the warrant that the
officer need not give notice. The magistrate
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath,
that the object of the search may be quickly
destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that
physical harm may result to any person if
notice were given.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) (1990), governing
authorization of a nighttime search, states:
The magistrate must insert a direction
in the [search] warrant that it be served in
the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral
testimony state a reasonable cause to believe
a search is necessary in the night to seize
the property prior to it being concealed,
destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other
good reason; in which case he may insert a
2

direction that it be served any time of the
day or night.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Rene Ruiz was charged with unlawful
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a
second degree felony (R. 5). He moved to suppress evidence
seized in a warranted search of his apartment, arguing that
authority to conduct the search on a nighttime basis was
improperly granted (R. 25). The motion was denied (R. 60).
Defendant then pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 58-378(2)(b)(ii) (1990) (R. 1). As permitted under State v. Serv, 758
P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), defendant reserved the right to appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress (R. 138). He was sentenced
to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison and fined (R. 9394).

On appeal, he challenges only the magistrate's

authorization in the search warrant to conduct the search on a
no-knock basis and at nighttime.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because defendant does not challenge the underlying
probable cause finding, this appeal proceeds upon the premise
that the magistrate properly found probable cause, that is, "a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime" would be
found in defendant's apartment.

See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.

213, 235, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).

This premise is

supported by a controlled cocaine buy in defendant's apartment
3

(warrant affidavit at 2, found at R. 55 and copied at Appendix 2
to Br. of Appellant).

See State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1110

(Utah App. 1988) (single drug buy established probable cause),
cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).

The facts bearing upon

the magistrate's authorization to conduct the search on a noknock, nighttime basis are therefore of primary concern.
The Warrant and the Search
The warrant affidavit recited that defendant had
"intense counter surveillance" measures in place.

These measures

had been reported by a confidential informant; the police officer
affiant had also observed "persons walking back and forth in
front of the apartment, writting [sic] down license plates,
watching for persons being followed, and or just being a lookout"
(affid. at 2).

The officer reported that all apparent drug

trafficking activity around the apartment had been observed "in
the evening hours" (affid. at 3).

He related reports from two

confidential informants that defendant claimed to have a handgun
that he would use to defend his contraband (i,d. ) . Finally, the
officer, a trained narcotics investigator, recited that "[h]andguns have been found on most narcotic search warrants" (affid. at
2, 3). Accordingly, a no-knock, nighttime entry to conduct the
search was requested, and the magistrate granted the request
(affid. at 3; warrant at 2, found at R. 52-53 and copied at
Appendix 2 to Br. of Appellant).
The warrant was executed on June 5, 1990, and cocaine,
packaging materials, and cash was seized, along with four
4

handguns (search warrant return, found at R. 57-59 and copied at
Appendix 2 to Br. of Appellant).

However, no other circumstances

of the actual search are disclosed in the record:

there is no

information regarding the precise time of the search, the exact
manner of entry, the number of officers involved, the number of
persons on the premises when entry was made, or whether such
persons, if present, were asleep or awake.
The Motion to Suppress
Defendant's motion to suppress, relying on State v.
Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 732-33 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d
327 (Utah 1991), challenged only the authority to conduct the
search at night (R. 25). He did not challenge the warrant's noknock provision.

Counsel and the court determined that no

testimony would be needed to decide the motion; accordingly,
neither the affiant officer nor defendant testified (R. 97, 104).
The court and counsel discussed Rowe at length,
comparing its standards with the warrant affidavit in this case
(R. 104-121).

The trial court observed that the Rowe nighttime

search request had been supported by little more than checked
boxes on a pre-printed affidavit (R. 119; see Rowe, 806 P.2d at
731).

In contrast here, reading the affidavit as a whole, the

court noted the information specifying nighttime drug activity,
the evident presence of "lookouts," and a risk of armed
resistance, along with an inference of readily disposable
contraband (R. 119-21).

Accordingly, the court ruled that the

5

affidavit showed "a reasonable basis" for a nighttime search, and
denied the motion to suppress (R. 121).1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because defendant never challenged the no-knock entry,
that issue is not properly before this Court.

Further, defendant

has not established the time when the search actually occurred,
nor shown that anybody was home at the time. Absent such facts,
he cannot claim harm from the magistrate's authorization of a
nighttime search.

Accordingly, his appeal should be rejected,

for it turns on "facts" not before this Court.
If this was a nighttime search, the warrant affidavit
set forth sufficient information to justify it.

Once a probable

cause finding is made, such that a search will occur, a lower
quantum of proof and broad deference should be given to decisions
about how to conduct the search.

Such deference should account

for officer expertise in conducting searches safely and
effectively.

This affidavit adequately showed particular reasons

for conducting a nighttime search, and the nighttime authority
granted in the warrant should therefore be reaffirmed.

Although the prosecutor submitted findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the trial court, defendant objected to them,
and the trial court apparently did not sign them (R. 74-79).

6

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED THE "NO-KNOCK" ISSUE,
AND HAS NOT SHOWN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE
SEARCH WAS ACTUALLY CONDUCTED; THEREFORE, THE
DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD BE
SUMMARILY AFFIRMED.
Before proceeding to the merits of the issues on
appeal, some preliminary matters require attention.

As follows,

there are questions of waiver and an insufficient factual record.
The latter problem*may allow for summary disposition of this
appeal.
A.

Only the Nighttime Search Authorization, Not the
No-Knock Authorization, is Properly Before this
Court.
First, because defendant specifically challenged only

the nighttime search authorization in the warrant (R. 25), his
present challenge to the no-knock authorization need not be
considered.

See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(a) (grounds for motion must

be particularly stated).

Nor does he show exceptional

circumstances that would require review of this issue for the
first time on appeal; accordingly, such review should be deemed
waived.

See State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985);

State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 (Utah App. 1991).2

2

Waiver also bars defendant's attempt to attack the warrant as
not meeting constitutional "particularity" requirements (Br. of
Appellant at 19-21).
An apparent misnumbering of defendant's
apartment in the warrant affidavit (affid. at 2; compare affid. at
1, warrant at 1, warrant return at 1), was never brought to the
trial court's attention.
Nor was any argument about lack of
particularity in the items to be seized made in the trial court.
7

While this Court need not address the no-knock
question, similar policy concerns—such as possible evidence loss
and safety considerations—underlie both Utah's no-knock and
nighttime search statutes.

See State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 732-

34 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991)
(comparing Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23-10 and 77-23-5(1) (1990)).
Therefore, the State's arguments regarding the nighttime search
authorization will include reference to no-knock cases.

Further,

if this Court does*not agree that defendant's no-knock challenge
was waived, the State's arguments in support of the nighttime
authorization also apply to the no-knock question.
B.

Because Defendant has Not Shown How the Search Was
Actually Conducted, this Court Need Not Review the
Nighttime Search Authorization.
As a second preliminary issue, defendant has not

established that this search was conducted at night.

Nor has he

shown that anybody was home when his apartment was searched, or
shown the time of the search.

Absent such showings, this Court

need not review the nighttime search authorization.
In State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988), officers
conducted a warranted residential search upon a no-knock entry,
failing to recognize that their warrant did not authorize such
entry.
n.l.

However, nobody was home at the time.

Ld. at 700-01 &

The Utah Supreme Court held that because nobody was home

when the search occurred, the safety and privacy interests
underlying the normal Mknock-and-announceM requirement had not

8

been implicated.

.Id. Therefore, suppression of the seized

evidence was not required.

Ijd. at 702-03 (citing authorities).

Under Buck, if a search warrant is executed in a
clearly unauthorized manner, but no harm to privacy and safety
interests results, beyond that inherent in a routine search, the
fruits of the search are admissible as evidence.

It should

follow that if a no-knock or nighttime entry is. authorized in a
warrant, but officers do not actually execute the warrant on such
basis, the special*concerns of such searches are also not
implicated.

Indeed, People v. Barber, 449 N.Y.S. 2d 140, 145

(N.Y. App. Div. 1982), reached precisely this result:

evidence

was not suppressed where police did not rely upon an unjustified
no-knock authorization, but instead announced themselves when
executing the warrant.
In light of Buck and Barber, the merits of defendant's
challenge to the authorization of a nighttime search should not
be addressed.

It may seem likely that because they had authority

to do so, the officers did conduct a nighttime search.
it is possible that they did not.

However,

It is also possible that, as

in Buck, nobody was home when the entry was made.

Nor is there

any evidence about the hour when the search took place.

This is

important, for not all nighttime searches are equally traumatic.
See State v. Purser, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 31 n.l (Utah App.
March 11, 1992 (search when occupants are more likely to be awake
is less problematic).

9

The facts of the search as actually conducted are also
necessary to decide whether, even if an improper nighttime search
occurred, suppression is the required remedy.3

In United States

v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S.
921, 99 S. Ct. 1247 (1979), a warranted search that was supported
by probable cause, 586 F.2d at 1119, but where the warrant
improperly authorized a nighttime search under the applicable
federal rule, id., at 1122, did not require suppression of the
seized evidence.

Instead, finding no police "bad faith," and no

unduly "abusive" search, the court held that suppression was not
required, id. at 1125.

Similarly, in State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d

1366 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that evidence
obtained by a police officer acting outside his statutory
geographic authority was not suppressible.

Relying on Searp and

other authorities, the Court held that absent deliberate, "bad
faith" police statutory violations, or violations amounting to
the deprivation of fundamental constitutional rights, suppression
was not required.

744 P.2d at 1368-69 & nn. 6-13.

The reasonableness of a warranted search "depends on
the facts of the case."

Buck, 756 P.2d at 703.

Similarly, in

State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme
Court approved the rule that "a defendant must submit some
evidence in support of his motion to suppress or the motion would
3

As the petitioner on certiorari in Rowe, now under advisement
in the Utah Supreme Court the State has argued, as it does here,
that suppression is not always required when a search is
erroneously conducted at night. State v. Rowe, No. 910165, Br. of
Petitioner at 8-17.
10

be denied."

Here, in failing to establish facts upon which the

reasonableness of this search can be assessed, defendant has left
the State and this Court with no information upon which his
motion to suppress can be meaningfully reviewed.
Under these circumstances, any analysis of the
nighttime search authorization will amount to an advisory
opinion, based upon hypothetical "facts," disfavored by appellate
courts.

See Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813

P.2d 1216, 1220-2T& n.8 (Utah App. 1991).

This Court should

decline to issue such an opinion; instead, it should summarily
affirm the denial of defendant's motion to suppress.
POINT TWO
THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY AUTHORIZED A NIGHTTIME
SEARCH, AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE
MAGISTRATE'S DECISION.
If it is assumed that this was a nighttime search, the
magistrate's authorization of such search can be examined.

Upon

reviewing Rowe, the trial court denied defendant's motion to
suppress.

Under the correct standards of proof and review for

nighttime search authorization, this ruling should be affirmed.
A.

Nighttime Search Authorization Should be
Deferentially Reviewed for Reasonableness.
Defendant clearly believes that a nighttime search

requires a showing of "probable cause" that such a search is
necessary (Br. of Appellant at 14, 19), but offers no supporting
analysis.

He is mistaken.

As follows, the decision to conduct a

search at night should require a less strict showing, and be
deferentially reviewed.
11

1.

Reasonableness, Not Probable Cause, Is the Test.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) (1990) requires that
"reasonable cause" be shown to conduct a nighttime search.

This

phrase lends some support to defendant's belief that a nighttime
search request must satisfy the "probable cause" level of proof.
See State v. Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1236 (Utah App. 1989)
(equating statutory "reasonable cause" for warrantless arrest
with "probable cause").

The main opinion in Rowe, however, noted

that the "precise quantum of information" to justify a nighttime
search is undefined.

806 P.2d at 733.

For several reasons,

cause to conduct a search at night should require a lesser
quantum of proof than probable cause.
First, section 77-23-5(1) comes into play only when
probable cause to issue the warrant has already been shown.

The

statute simply directs that warrants must normally be served in
the daytime, unless cause for a nighttime search exists.

It

presupposes the issuance of a warrant, and addresses only the
question of when the search will occur.

Thus probable cause, in

its usual sense, is no longer in issue when a nighttime search
request is made.
Second, the warrant overcomes the core privacy
expectation of the occupants of the place to be searched:

the

premises are going to be entered, even over the occupants'
possible objection.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(1) (1990) (if

occupants do not promptly respond to announcement of purpose,
searching officers may forcibly enter).
12

Indeed, Utah Code Ann. §

77-23-1 (1990) defines a search warrant as a judicial order to
search the premises.
Third, the police, commanded to conduct a search,
should be allowed some latitude in choosing the best way and time
to perform this duty.

See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238,

257, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 1693 (1979) (question of how to conduct
warrant-authorized search "is generally left to the discretion of
the executing officers," subject to reasonableness requirement).
Accordingly, the nighttime search statute should not be given an
over-restrictive reading.

Instead, nighttime search requests

under it should be concerned with reasonableness, not probable
cause.

The trial court's "reasonable basis" approach (R. 121)

was therefore correct.
Section 77-23-5, as construed in Rowe, requires a
nighttime search request to show a risk of evidence loss, or
"other good reason," such as a physical safety risk, if a daytime
search is attempted.

806 P.2d at 733-34 & n.5. As a

reasonableness question, the quantum of proof for such a showing
should be more akin to "reasonable suspicion" than to "probable
cause."

So long as some evidence, specific to the case at hand,

suggests that evidence may be lost, or safety may be imperiled in
a daytime search, the nighttime search request should be granted.
See State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990) (defining
reasonable suspicion).
A similar rule was followed in United States v. Searp,
586 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 921, 99 S.
13

Ct. 1247 (1979), interpreting the federal nighttime search rule.
The Sixth Circuit held that the federal provision "requires only
some factual basis for a prudent conclusion that the greater
intrusiveness of a nighttime search is justified by the
exigencies of the situation."

586 F.2d at 1121. The federal

rule is similar to Utah's nighttime search statute:

"The warrant

shall be served in the daytime, unless the issuing authority, by
appropriate provision in the warrant, and for reasonable cause
shown, authorizes Its execution at times other than daytime."
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c)(1) (West 1991 Rev. Ed.). Utah's nighttime
search statute should be similarly construed.
As a matter of policy, a defendant should not be
allowed to defeat a valid probable cause finding by claiming that
the decision of how to act upon that finding must be based upon
an equally strict standard of proof.

Efforts to avoid the

detection of criminal activity do not create a expectation that
such activity will remain "private."

State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48,

51 (Utah), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1057, 102 S. Ct. 606 (1981).
By selling illegal drugs at night (affid. at 3), defendant did
not confer legal protection upon that crime. Accordingly, this
Court should hold that reasonableness, or a reasonable suspiciontype standard, applies to nighttime search requests.
2.

Appellate Deference is Appropriate.

Defendant also argues for nondeferential appellate
review of nighttime search authorization in a warrant (Br. of
appellant at 8-13).

His argument, however, is derived from State
14

v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1991), which deals solely with
the question of probable cause to issue the warrant, .id. at 832.
This issue, again, is not presented on this appeal.

His argument

is also based upon Judge Orme's criticisms of deferential warrant
review, in his Weaver concurrence, not the main opinion.
Therefore, Weaver only minimally supports defendant, if at all.
The reasons for requiring a lower quantum of proof for
a nighttime search, already set forth in this brief, also support
deferential review"* of nighttime search authority.

Further,

notwithstanding dictum in Rowe, 806 P.2d at 734 n.5 ("of course,
ordinarily a nighttime search would pose a heightened safety risk
. . . " ) , additional deference is due because of officer expertise
in performing searches.

Police officers, not appellate courts,

are charged with executing warrants successfully, such that
evidence will not be lost.

They are also the ones at risk for

real physical injury in carrying out a task that, at best, must
be fraught with hazard.

Reviewing courts should not

overscrutinize the means, requested by officers and then approved
by a magistrate, by which a search is conducted.
Defendant asserts that nondeferential review of search
warrants is necessary because "Utah magistrates do not uniformly
have the opportunity to develop expertise in issuing search
warrants" (Br. of Appellant at 10). This assertion is neither
"generally known," nor "capable of accurate and ready
determination."

Therefore, contrary to defendant's invitation,

it should not be judicially noticed.
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See Utah R. Evid. 201(b).

Efforts to put "magistrate expertise" into issue should be
supported with evidence, not conjecture/
Hindsight-based, nondeferential review of nighttime
search requests would not advance the interest in stable,
consistent results.
(Utah App. 1991).

See State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1299-1300

Indeed, a possible reversal of this nighttime

authorization by a two-to-one, split appellate decision would
actually reflect a three-to-two determination of all the involved
judges—magistrate, trial court, and this Court—that the
authorization was valid.

Therefore, particularly in a close

case, c£. Weaver, 817 P.2d at 835 (Orme, J., concurring),
deference to the warrant is appropriate.
Accordingly, officer opinion that a nighttime search is
more likely to safely succeed than a daytime search should not be
lightly dismissed by a magistrate, and certainly, once approved
by a magistrate, should not be subject to nondeferential, afterthe-fact reversal on appeal.

In Rowe, a nighttime authorization

was reversed because this Court could find no. evidence, in the
warrant affidavit, showing cause for such a search.
734.

806 P.2d at

However, so long as some evidence supports such cause, a

magistrate's authorization for a nighttime search should be not
be reversed unless it is clearly unreasonable.

defendant also implies that some magistrates neglect their
duty to enforce the federal and state constitutions, see U.S.
Const. Art VI, cl. 3, Utah Const. Art. IV, § 10, at the behest of
"forum shopping" law officers (Br. of Appellant at 11-12). This
accusation is also unsupported, and should be rejected.
16

B.

The Magistrate's Authorization of a Nighttime
Search in this Case Should be Reaffirmed.
Under the foregoing standards, this nighttime search

authorization was valid.

Both concerns for evidence loss and for

safety risks were shown in the affidavit, read "in a common sense
manner and as a whole," Rowe, 806 P.2d at 732 (quotation and
citation omitted).
Evidence might have been lost during a daytime, more
easily observed, officer approach to the premises.

Informants

told the affiant officer that defendant had counter-surveillance
measures in place, and this information was confirmed by direct
observation (affid. at 2). In his expertise, the observing
officer reasonably concluded that the people seen in front of
defendant's apartment and writing things down, were acting as
"lookouts" for defendant (id). The use of lookouts, in turn,
supports a reasonable inference that defendant had measurers in
place to quickly dispose of contraband upon a warning that
officers were approaching.
Safety concerns were supported by defendant's
statements, reported by informants, that he was armed and
intended to forcibly defend his drugs (affid. at 3). Further,
defendant has not challeged the affiant officer's statement that
"[h]andguns have been found on most narcotic search warrants"
(id.).

The fact that drug dealers are often armed, well within

the officer's experience, has also been noticed by Utah's
appellate courts.

State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah

1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v. Leonard, 175 Utah
17

Adv. Rep. 49, 54 n.9 (Utah App. Dec. 5, 1991), petition for cert.
filed. No. 920140 (Utah March 11, 1992).

Accord People v.

Hughes, 767 P.2d 1201, 1204-05 (Colo. 1989).
Accordingly, the magistrate's decision that a nighttime
search would be more likely to succeed, and less likely to result
in bodily injury, was properly affirmed by the trial court.
Accord United States v. Prvor, 652 F. Supp. 1353, 1363 (D. Me.
1987) (finding "genuine risks" if search of suspected armed
robber's room were attempted in daytime); People v. Kimble, 44
Cal. 3d 480, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803, 810 n.6 (1988)
(citing Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure); State v.
Ailport, 412 N.W. 2d 35, 36 (Minn. App. 1987) (safety
justification for nighttime search supported by affiant officer's
experience that searches are often resisted).

This Court should

therefore reaffirm the nighttime search authorization.
CONCLUSION
Defendant has failed to produce evidence that this
probable cause-supported search was actually conducted at night,
or that the search might have been unreasonable in any respect.
Further, the magistrate's authorization to conduct the search at
night was supported by the warrant affidavit.

For these reasons,

the denial of defendant's motion to suppress, and his conviction
for possession of a controlled substance, should be affirmed.

18

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25> day of July, 1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to LISA
J. REMAL AND ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, attorneys for appellant, Salt
Lake Legal Defenders Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ~&

19

day of July, 1992.

